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At the end of Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy Iris
Young asserts that a full account of democratic theory needs both
deliberative democracy and activism. The problem with this, as Young
points out, is that “the two kinds of activities cannot usually occur
together”; given this, our best response is to “affirm them both while
recognizing the tension between them” (2001, 689).
With this statement, Young draws attention to a serious gap in
deliberative democratic literature. Activist Challenges addresses new
ground in deliberative theory and the work that Young does here to
illustrate the tension between deliberative democracy and activism is
very important. DIn large part as a response to feminist critiques of
impartiality, particular constructions of rationality, and acceptable
modes of speech that devalue women’s contributions (1990, 7, 97,
99-107; 1996, 123-24; 2000, 36-51) deliberative theorists spend a con-
siderable amount of time and energy discussing the mechanisms that
we can use to make deliberations more inclusive. While there is def-
initely a need for this, this is certainly important,  an unintended con-
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do not appear to meet deliberative criteria cannot participate (either
formally or effectively depending upon the situation) in deliberations.
Moreover, after these revisions their exclusion now has greater nor-
mative force. This does not bode well for protestors: if deliberants
make mistakes applying these criteria, then marginalized deliberants,
who face exclusion as protestors, have no recourse. 
It is here, in terms of marginalized deliberants, that Young
addresses the tension between activism and deliberative democracy in
terms of its impact upon marginalized deliberants. Her work is espe-
cially important in terms of framing this problem given her earlier
work on social groups and, most notably, her use of difference as a
resource. One of Young’s most important contributions to democrat-
ic theory is the normative weight that she attributes to group differ-
ence and, in particular, the fundamental role that difference plays in
creating social and institutional structures. In Justice and the Politics
of Difference Young draws from social movements and feminist liter-
ature as she justifies why we ought to take difference into account.
Intersections of class, race, sexuality, age, ability, and culture within
feminist groups lead Young to focus upon a broader discussion of
activism in which she goes beyond looking at women’s oppression to
deal with multiple oppressed groups (1990, 13-14). Young She argues
that because equality sometimes requires different treatment for dom-
inated or oppressed people. Consequently, we must focus upon the
ways that group differences inform how we ought to understand group
relations and how we ought to structure institutions when we theo-
rize procedural issues of participation and decision-making (1990). 
Young revisits the democratic potential of group difference in
her later works (1996, 1997). Here sShe argues that we ought to use
difference as a resource for democratic communication: people can
only communicate across their differences if they use their social per-
spective as a way to identify partiality, expand social knowledge, and,
ultimately, to move the terms of democratic debate from a perspec-
tive that unfairly assumes a biased standard of evaluation to one that
people build collectively (1997). This move strengthens the institu-
tional aspect of Young’s work as it draws attention to the constitutive
role that differently-situated groups have in terms of framing demo-
cratic discussions: a role that is particularly important when we turn
our attention to the tension between deliberative democracy and
activism. 
These themes of difference and the constructive roles that
groups play inform Inclusion and Democracy, in which Young offers
her most comprehensive account of deliberative (communicative)
democracy. Here, three things in particular stand out and connect this
book to earlier works. First, Young advocates the key role that social
group positioning ought to play. The concept of difference as a
resource has a stronger normative basis in Inclusion and Democracy.
: Young offers many specific, carefully-crafted arguments as to how
differently-situated people can reframe democratic procedures. The
deliberative use of greeting, rhetoric, and narrative takes feminist cri-
tiques into account. These new modes of communication Bbuilding
on Young’sher earlier work.  As she applies them there are now clear
areas of practical application for difference as a resource arise, as
well as and illustrations of specific ways that marginalized groups
can pursue full and effective inclusion (2000, 57-77; 115-120). 
Second, and relatedly, Young’s chapter on inclusive political
communication develops her work in Communication and the Other.
Whereas in her earlier article Young focuses upon how greeting, rhet-
oric, and storytelling work (in terms of the group-specific critiques
that people level and how this approach can convince others of inher-
ent biases in old modes of communication), she is much more spe-
cific in Inclusion and Democracy about the ways that deliberants can
use these modes of communication in order to expand the scope of
deliberative democracy (2000, 57-77; 115-120). The communicative
approach helps deliberants to address hegemonic views, as Young
points out with an instance of narrative in which feminist activism
led to sexual harassment legislation (2000, 72-73). In another case,
Young cites Carol Mosley Braun’s successful use of rhetoric in the
US Senate, and praises the positive contribution of “her extreme and
even disruptive speech” (2000, 67). These examples, in addition to
their contribution to the inclusive potential of deliberative democra-
cy, are also interesting in terms of their activist roots. When Young
returns to greeting, rhetoric, and narrative in Inclusion and Democracy
her examples extend the scope of communication from her examples
in “Communication and the Other. Beyond Deliberative Democracy”
to argue that the range of necessary “forms of making a point” also
include “visual media, signs and banners, street demonstration, guer-
rilla theatre, and the use of symbols” (2000, 65). These latter exam-




L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   È V .  2  N .  1   È P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
the role that activism plays to question existing structures, support
what Young labels a more antagonistic model of deliberative democ-
racy (2000, 49). 
Finally, Young emphasises that in order to have truly inclusive
deliberations we must listen to people’s claims “unless and until they
can be demonstrated as completely lacking in respect from all oth-
ers, or incoherent” (2000, 70). With this admission the range of per-
missible arguments is, at least initially, very wide and stands in con-
trast to many other versions of deliberative democracy that narrow
the range of acceptable discourse.1
The amendments that Young makes have considerably far-
reaching implications. The types of reasons that deliberants can use
and the modes of communication that people can engage in to pres-
ent them in this expansive model of deliberative democracy mean that
marginalized people will have greater political efficacy. Deliberants
have to listen to arguments that many conceptions of deliberative
democracy exclude, and even where marginalized groups might be
unsuccessful in their claims Young is careful to insist that deliberants
must establish procedures to register dissent (2000, 24).
This last point is important. The problem that activism poses
to deliberative democracy is a significant one for deliberative theo-
ry. If we do not take activism seriously then we ignore, risking delib-
erative legitimacy, the potential cost to marginalized groups who are
contemplating leaving deliberations because of their effective exclu-
sion. If marginalized groups leave because of this then deliberative
legitimacy is at risk.  
In response to this potentially unjust exclusion, Young makes
two institutional moves to address activism in a deliberative demo-
cratic context. The first is to expand the scope of reasonableness to
include (some) arguments that activists make, and the second is to
recommend that deliberants address activist challenges by creating
“inclusive deliberative settings” (2001). The purpose of these settings
is to let activists examine social and economic structures when they
argue that structural injustice works to effectively exclude them from
deliberations. The idea is that by deliberating separately, people will
be more likely to articulate what is wrong with the starting premise
and to convey the seriousness of this to the deliberative group (an
approach that is similar to the work that consciousness-raising groups
do). The inclusive deliberative settings are separate from the deliber-
ative group: they exist “for the most part . . . outside of and opposed
to ongoing settings of official policy discussion” (2001, 684-685) and,
as such, appear to be part of the larger deliberative structure. It is
unclear as to what, exactly, inclusive deliberative settings will con-
sist of. Given Young’s account, however, it makes the most sense to
think of them as ad-hoc deliberative groups. Calling for these groups
to be “outside of and opposed to” the ongoing discussions of the
“official” deliberative group suggests two things. First, activists are
still institutionally connected to the deliberative group and, as such,
must still meet deliberative criteria in inclusive deliberative settings.
Second, it suggests that people in the deliberative group will contin-
ue to conduct their own deliberations on the basis of the premise that
activists contest. 
Establishing these inclusive deliberative settings does give
activists more power within a deliberative framework, but the prob-
lem remains that the people in the (original) deliberative group still
have the balance of power. This power manifests itself in (at least)
two ways. First, because deliberative criteria will still govern the inclu-
sive deliberative settings activists risk co-optation. Activists who
would gather in inclusive deliberative settings have starting premises
that already meet deliberative criteria, but nonetheless find their prem-
ises marginalized because the rest of the deliberative group (who hold
the balance of power) choose to frame deliberations differently.
Activists are free in inclusive deliberative settings to frame delibera-
tions according to their own premises: these ad hoc groups can go
on to deliberate as they otherwise would — although with the obvi-
ous thought that they will give to convince people within the delib-
erative group to reconsider. Young does not directly argue for this
extension of deliberative criteria, but it is implicit in the way that she
discusses inclusive deliberative settings as a solution. Nothing about
the activist’s response to the problem is incompatible with delibera-
tive criteria: the problem is one of framing and Young’s assertion that
the deliberative group has to help create these deliberative settings
suggests that they will (and can) do so only if people in inclusive
deliberative settings meet deliberative criteria. 
Second, when people in inclusive deliberative settings finish
their own deliberations and return to the deliberative group they still
have to engage with the same framing of deliberative criteria and the
same people who previously rejected their starting premise. Now, after
deliberating in the inclusive deliberative settings people should have
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vince the rest of the deliberants that their premises are important and
that the deliberative group ought to re-frame deliberations according-
ly. Creating inclusive deliberative settings greatly improves delibera-
tive democracy’s ability to effectively include marginalized groups.
However, there are no guarantees that the deliberative group will lis-
ten, and if they do not then we are left with the original problem. 
Young’s push to develop institutional mechanisms to deal with
protest is an important move in deliberative democratic theory. The
structural changes that Young proposes with an expansive conception
of reasonableness and inclusive deliberative settings show that she
takes this significant problem seriously. The structure of the inclusive
deliberative settings, however,  as ad-hoc deliberative groups that deal
with protest, however, is different from an institutional move that
addresses activist groups. In Young’s proposal the role of marginal-
ized groups who would, without inclusive deliberative settings, mobi-
lize as protest groups is one of a critical deliberants: people who, but
for the chance to critique the framing of deliberations would other-
wise leave to protest their effective exclusion. Critical deliberants,
importantly, are not activists. Young’s proposal addresses marginal-
ized deliberants before they become (or after they agree to stop being)
activists. The institutional ties between inclusive deliberative settings
and the deliberative group work to keep would-be activists from leav-
ing the deliberative group altogether, or, if they have already left,
make sure that activists re-enter as deliberants. 
The ability of Young’s conception of deliberative democracy to
address this exclusion is significant. The problem, however, is that this
otherwise commendable response does not account for activism: that is,
if there ought to be deliberative recognition of activists while they are
outside of, and opposed to, the deliberative group. That Young’s account
concedes that deliberants agree that activists do make valid points about
effective exclusion and that she accounts for this in her theory is a big
step for deliberative democracy. However, the fact that it is deliberative
democrats who, through a closely connected ad-hoc part of the delib-
erative group, address the valid points that activists raise means that
Young’s discussion of activism ends up becoming about the arguments
that deliberative democrats are aware of because of the efforts of activists
but is not a discussion of activism itself.
Despite the problems that Young runs into in terms of her abil-
ity to fully account for activism, her emphasis on the fact that delib-
erants have to listen to a wide range of arguments and must take dis-
sent seriously is very important. Additionally, her advocacy of insti-
tutional measures that facilitate this (2000, 2001) is a significant move.
When we look at the work that Young does in Activist Challengeshere
in conjunction with the activist-inspired sources that she draws from
to emphasize the transformative role of group difference in Inclusion
and Democracy, we are left with an important normative foundation
on which we can address issues of inclusion and exclusion.
In Justice and the Politics of Difference Young begins with a
story of a protest in Washington DC and  looks to the constructive
role that social groups play. By the time that Young wrote Inclusion
and Democracy she had developed ways to theorize participation and
decision-making that better encompass marginalized groups and alter-
native forms of effective political communication. These new
approaches retain the earlier influence of social movements and fem-
inist activism and, indeed, are inspired by them. Young still looks to
the role that “creative acts of civil disobedience” (2000, 175) play in
drawing focuses our normative attention onto the exclusions that still
take place in democratic processes despite our best efforts.  What is
most interesting about Young’s work is the way that she and consis-
tently asks us to reframe democratic participation in the hopes of suc-
cessfully addressing this. Taking group difference seriously led Young
to identify activism as a significant challenge to deliberative democ-
racy’s claims to inclusivity ; aApproaching group difference creative-
ly and using it as a resource led Youngher to develop a more inclu-
sive conception of deliberative democracy. Taking group difference
seriously led her to identify activism as a significant challenge to
deliberative democracy’s claims to inclusivity. and  Reading these two
aspects of her work in conjunction can, I hope, inspirepush us to con-
tinue to draw from her work in this area and to press for additional
creative institutional change in order to continue her work and to
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NOTES
1 See especially Daniel Weinstock “Saving Democracy from Deliberation.” In R.
Beiner and W. Norman (eds.), Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary
Reflections. (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2001) pp. 78 –91.
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